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Abstract 
IT Outsourcing (ITO) relationship management has long been a challenging issue. Past research 
has been devoted to four main mechanisms, namely contract management, partnership 
management, organizational control and boundary spanning. Whereas the first three mechanisms 
have attracted much attention, the study on boundary spanning remains scant, adopting only the 
client perspective and overlooking the vendor. In this study, we fill that gap by studying the 
boundary-spanning practice of two ITO vendors. The data collection and analysis are guided by a 
creative and sound theoretical lens - the alignment between boundary-spanning capability and 
boundary-spanning strategy. Two by-design models were thus derived. The alignment-form model 
depicts the outlook of alignment, and the aligning-path model depicts the process of achieving 
alignment. The study complements the ITO literature by providing a more complete picture of 
boundary spanning and provides practitioners, especially vendors, with specific guidelines on how 
to span boundaries.  
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Introduction 
The IT outsourcing (ITO) relationship is critical to the success of ITO because it meets outsourcing objectives for 
both clients and vendors. On the one hand, a harmonious ITO relationship can help the client to decrease 
transaction/production costs (Ang and Straub 1998), to access advanced technologies (Loh and Venkatraman 1992) 
and to focus on the competence that is strategic in nature (Lee et al. 2004). On the other hand, a healthy ITO 
relationship can help the vendor to focus on project quality and efficiency (Gopal and Gosain 2009), to access 
domain knowledge of the client’s business (Levina and Vaast 2008), and to improve market reputation through 
client’s recommendation (Levina and Ross 2003). Given its importance, vendors and clients have devoted enormous 
efforts to managing the ITO relationship. For example, client project managers spend more than 70% of their time, 
on average, managing the relationship (Kern and Willcocks 2002). Yet, despite these efforts, the relationship is still 
problematic, as it is intrinsically complex and includes various issues, such as prevalent opportunistic behavior 
(Argyres et al. 2007), multiple conflicts (Gopal and Gosain 2009) and numerous boundaries (Levina and Vaast 
2008; Ramasubbu et al. 2008) between clients and vendors. Often, these issues are so acute that the ITO relationship 
itself is damaged (e.g. Cowley 2004). According to a survey by Deloitte Consulting, 70% of clients perceived their 
ITO relationships as unsatisfactory (Dongo 2008). Consistently, vendors are not content with the relationship either. 
A recent study reveals that one third of vendors intended to terminate their ITO contracts prematurely (Heng et al. 
2009).  
Because of these challenges, ITO relationship management has attracted much attention from researchers, who 
strive to find the effective mechanisms to manage the relationship. As a result, four mechanisms are researched into, 
namely contract management, partnership management, organizational control and boundary spanning. Contract 
management is used to limit opportunistic behavior between vendors and clients (Argyres et al. 2007; Gopal et al. 
2003). Yet, it has never succeeded in covering every facet of the complicated ITO relationship, and as a result the 
relationship often invokes partnership management, which is used to complement contract management (Lee and 
Kim 1999; Willcocks and Kern 1998). Organizational control, on the other hand, is used to reconcile conflicts 
between stakeholders and marshal their resources in the same direction (e.g. Carson 2007; Miranda and Kavan 
2005). Recently, boundary spanning has started to attract more attention. Given that vendors and clients often have 
radically different knowledge domains and expertise, for example vendors have strong technical knowledge but 
typically lack business domain knowledge, whereas clients have strong business domain knowledge but lack 
technical knowledge. In order to successfully manage an ITO relationship, it is important for both parties to 
collaborate on sharing knowledge across boundaries, thereby necessitating boundary spanning (Huang et al. 2001; 
Levina and Vaast 2008).  
These four mechanisms have not attracted equal attention in academia. Whereas contract management, partnership 
management and organizational control have long been researched and generated a great deal of findings, research 
on boundary spanning is comparatively new and the findings remain scarce (with exception of Levina and Kane 
2009; Levina and Vaast 2008). In our opinion, the boundary-spanning mechanism deserves more attention than it 
has received, especially with the new trend of offshore outsourcing (Couto et al. 2006). According to a report from 
McKinsey, the global market for offshore outsourcing is expected to exceed US$160 billion by 2012, up from 
US$60 billion in 2007 (Benni et al. 2009). IT managers have slowly realized that in addition to the lucrative labor 
cost arbitrage, organizations can also reap strategic benefits in offshore outsourcing, such as access to talents around 
the globe and ramping up projects ahead of the competition (Carmel and Agarwal 2002). Currently, the majority of 
ITOs have a substantial offshore component. Yet, despite the value it brings, the offshore component also brings 
liabilities to the ITO relationship. Because of the special situation of the client and the vendor being in different 
countries, the offshore outsourcing suffers from numerous language and culture boundaries on top of the general 
knowledge and expertise boundaries (Levina and Vaast 2008; Ramasubbu et al. 2008). As a result, the boundary 
issue becomes more salient and in turn, inhibits collaboration significantly and renders a healthy ITO relationship 
barely achievable (Levina and Vaast 2008). Under this circumstance, the understanding of boundary spanning 
becomes more valuable and, indeed, imperative. 
Reviewing the limited research on the boundary-spanning mechanism, we find that researchers have focused on the 
mechanism mainly from the client perspective and sought to understand how clients span boundaries with vendors 
(Levina and Kane 2009; Levina and Vaast 2008), whereas how vendors span boundaries with clients is unwittingly 
left out. Vendor boundary spanning is also as critical as that of the client, if not more so. This is because vendors are 
often responsible for initiating boundary spanning between the two parties (Whitten and Leidner 2006) and the final 
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effectiveness of boundary spanning often hinges on vendors rather than on clients (Levina and Kane 2009). Hence, 
without a clear understanding of how vendors span boundaries, the successful boundary spanning may not be 
achievable in the ITO relationship, and the increasingly prevalent boundaries may turn the relationship into a failure.  
Our research aims to fill that gap. We took the case study methodology and compared boundary-spanning practice 
across two vendors, which were chosen based on their strengths and successes in spanning boundaries.  
The main part of this paper is organized as follows. First, we review the literature on ITO relationship management 
and on boundary spanning. The former literature helps us to understand the roles and values of boundary spanning in 
the ITO relationship and the latter literature helps us to create the theoretical lens, which is adopted to guide data 
collection and data analysis. It needs to be noted that, although boundary spanning is underrated in ITO literature, it 
is well recognized in the management literature. The findings from management literature, although not specifically 
catering for ITO, are relevant and also rich enough to constitute a sound theoretical lens for understanding vendor 
boundary spanning. After the literature review, we will present our empirical approach and analysis of the two field 
studies. The discussion section frames the two vendors’ boundary spanning through the theoretical lens. Finally, we 
conclude the study by drawing theoretical and practical implications.  
Theoretical Background 
ITO Relationship Management 
Research on ITO relationships management has been into four main mechanisms: contract management, partnership 
management, organizational control and boundary spanning. Contract management is adopted primarily to reduce 
opportunistic behavior. According to the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), opportunistic behavior comprises 
actions that lack honesty, are guileful and are motivated by self-interest (Williamson 1985). Opportunistic behavior 
is rife in the ITO context because vendors and clients, in general, cannot freely or unconditionally monitor each 
other’s behavior (Ang and Beath 1993). Contracts, which detail the rewards and penalties, can significantly limit the 
scope for this kind of misbehavior (Argyres et al. 2007).  Partnership management is used to complement contract 
management, which alone is not sufficient to eliminate opportunistic behavior, because contracts can never 
completely forecast every future task and are often ineffective in unexpected situations. Under these circumstances, 
vendors and clients often establish partnerships based upon common interests. The partnership can then induce the 
two parties to behave in accordance with each other’s interests, especially in unexpected situations (Lee and Kim 
1999; Willcocks and Kern 1998). Organizational control is used to ensure that individuals act in a manner that is 
consistent with the organization’s (Kirsch 1997) and partner’s (Gopal and Gosain 2009) goals and objectives. This 
mechanism has attracted much attention in ITO literature recently, because it is strong in reconciling stakeholder 
conflicts and integrating stakeholder capabilities (Kirsch 1997). In addition, these conflicts are prevalent in a ITO 
relationship as the relationship often involves multiple stakeholders (e.g. users, project managers, developers, and 
clients) and encapsulates intricate connections among these stakeholders (Gopal and Gosain 2009).  
However, anecdotal evidence has shown that ITO relationships which are equipped by sound contracts, mutual-trust 
partnerships and sophisticated control portfolios can still fail completely, simply because the relationships are 
featured with salient boundaries (e.g. Couto et al. 2006; Cowley 2004). Boundaries set groups/organizations apart on 
the basis of their practice (Bourdieu 1977) and have been proved to be a significant and enduring inhibitor to 
collaboration (Hinds and Bailey 2003; Hinds and Mortensen 2005). However, despite its significance, boundary 
spanning has only been studied in the ITO context recently (e.g. Levina and Kane 2009; Levina and Vaast 2008). 
One important contribution of the study is the influence and remedy for two types of boundaries, one being the 
typical knowledge and expertise boundaries, which is commonly known as occupational boundaries (Bechky 2003; 
Ramasubbu et al. 2008) and the other being the language and culture boundaries, which is also known as national 
boundaries (Hinds and Bailey 2003; Hinds and Mortensen 2005). Although national boundaries are less researched 
into in management literature, they are prevalent in ITO relationships and often, they create more damages to 
collaboration than the occupational boundaries (Levina and Vaast 2008). To overcome these national boundaries, 
many clients designate immigrant managers as boundary spanners. These managers, who emigrated from popular 
offshore countries such as India, China and Russia and who are now working in the US, Japan or Western Europe, 
can speak the offshore language and understand the offshore culture (Levina and Kane 2009). Yet, despite these 
findings, prior research is incomplete in that it stands mainly from the client perspective, whereas how vendors span 
boundary has been left out. In order to offer a more complete picture of the boundary spanning in ITO, our study 
aspires to understand how vendors span boundaries. Next, we revisit the boundary-spanning literature to develop a 
sound and relevant theoretical lens to understand vendor boundary spanning.   
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Boundary Spanning 
Although boundary spanning has not attracted much attention in the ITO context, it has been well studied in the 
management literature for over 40 years (e.g. Allen and Cohen 1969; Ancona and Caldwell 1992; Fennell and 
Alexander 1987; Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001; Tushman 1977). During this period, research has generated numerous 
findings, which, although not specifically catering for the ITO context, still offers us a relevant and rich foundation 
for constructing the theoretical lens. In general, findings in boundary spanning can be categorized into two important 
streams, one is pertinent to the boundary spanners (e.g. Dollinger 1984; Tushman and Scanlan 1981a; Tushman and 
Scanlan 1981b) and the other is pertinent to the boundary-spanning strategy (e.g. Ancona 1990; Ancona and 
Caldwell 1992; Levina and Vaast 2006). Boundary spanners, according to the seminal work of Leifer and Delbecq 
(1978), are defined as those who operate at the periphery of an organization, performing organizational relevant 
tasks and relating the organization with elements outside it. Boundary-spanning strategy, according to Ancona and 
Caldwell (1992), is defined as the patterns of boundary-spanning activities that a group or organization demonstrates 
over a period of time.  
Boundary Spanners 
In most cases, boundary spanner is a role rather than a specific individual. In fact, anyone in the organization can 
become a boundary spanner as long as s/he is assigned to do so (Tushman and Scanlan 1981a). Evidence has also 
shown that, under some circumstances the entire group can be assigned to span boundaries and in that event, 
everyone in the group functions as a boundary spanner, even though s/he may not be aware of it (Marrone et al. 
2007; Tushman 1977). Yet, the boundary-spanner role is not always officially assigned. Sometimes, individuals 
without designation for boundary spanning can still emerge and span boundaries successfully (Levina and Vaast 
2005). Although everyone in the group can be assigned as a boundary spanner, very few can do it successfully in 
practice, because there are certain abilities required and those abilities are not possessed by many employees. Levina 
and Vaast (2005) coins those who span boundaries successfully in practice as ‘boundary spanner-in-practice’.  
We are then interested in the abilities that boundary spanner-in-practice possesses. According to Tushman and 
Scanlan (1981a), an individual must be both an internal communication star and an external communication star, in 
order to successfully assume the boundary-spanner role. To emerge as an internal communication star, the individual 
needs to have the technical ability, so that s/he will be frequently consulted by internal members on work related 
matters (Allen and Cohen 1969). To emerge as an external communication star, the individual needs not only the 
technical ability but also the communicative ability, because numerous communication impediments exist between 
the internal and the external, such as idiosyncratic identities, routines and norms (Tushman and Scanlan 1981a). So 
we conclude that the technical ability and the communicative ability are the two critical abilities that employees 
need in order to span boundaries successfully. We term these two abilities as ‘boundary-spanning abilities’.  
There are also some other abilities that are required, for example the ability to process a large amount of information 
(Dollinger 1984), to promptly sense and respond to the environment (Marrone et al. 2007), and to appreciate and 
adapt to different cultures (Ang and Inkpen 2008). Given the limited space of the paper, we cannot cover all of them. 
However, it is also not necessary to do so, because these abilities are somewhat overlapped with the technical and 
communicative abilities: 1)  the information-processing ability can be understood as a result of the technical ability 
in that technical experts can process information much faster than non-experts; 2) the ability to appreciate and adapt 
to other cultures can be understood as part of the communicative ability, since good communicators should be able 
to understand other cultures easily, in order to communicate smoothly; and 3) the sensing and responding abilities 
can be viewed as the amalgamation of both technical and communicative abilities, as individuals need the 
communicative ability to sense the environment regularly and the technical ability to respond to the changes 
efficiently.  
One limitation of the past literature in boundary spanners is that researchers have devoted much attention to the 
ability of individual spanners, yet neglected the organizational capability that the spanners constitute. In fact, the 
boundary-spanning capability of the organization can be understood as the collection of boundary-spanning abilities 
of the individuals (Dollinger 1984). In other words, individuals’ technical and communicative abilities constitute the 
organization’s boundary-spanning capability. This limitation significantly restricts the contribution of the boundary-
spanner research, because without abstracting the organization capability, the spanners’ influence on the strategic 
level could not be tapped. Our study aspires to establish the linkage between the individual spanners and the 
boundary-spanning strategy. We do so by conceptualizing the boundary-spanning capability, which is constituted by 
individuals and can further influence the strategic choice of the organization with respect to boundary spanning.   
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Boundary-spanning Strategy 
According to the definition, boundary-spanning strategy can be discussed at both the organization-level and the 
group-level. Nevertheless, the focus has been on the group-level, with limited studies on the organization-level, 
which mainly looks at boundary spanning within an organizational network rather than between two specific 
organizations (e.g. Fennell and Alexander 1987). The group-level study is also more meaningful, because although 
boundary spanning is often discussed in the context of inter-organizational communication, the real interaction in 
fact happens at the group-level, and groups are the major units that handle the communication (Galbraith and 
Kazanjian 1988). Research at the group-level has been interested in categorizing different types of strategies and 
exploring the effects of those strategies on performance. Although the findings are rich, they are often unable to 
converge because different studies stem from very different positions and worse still, adherents of different positions 
typically do not concede that their perspective reveals only part of the whole story. This renders the borders of these 
findings less clear and reduces their implication. To solve the problem, a theoretical synthesis is imperative. Our 
synthesis was conducted through a thorough review and analysis of the literature. It results in three types of 
boundary-spanning strategies based on three distinct perspectives that the strategies took, namely the orientation 
perspective (e.g. Ancona 1990; Ancona and Caldwell 1992), the content perspective (e.g. Levina and Vaast 2006; 
Schultze and Orlikowski 2004) and the structure perspective (e.g. Marrone et al. 2007; Tushman 1977).   
First, with respect to the orientation, strategies can be identified as those which respond to and those which 
anticipate the environment. For example in Ancona (1990), the ‘informing’ and ‘parading’ strategies can be 
considered as responsive strategies, because they are characterized with boundary-spanning activities that are only 
initiated to respond to the environmental changes. On the other hand, the ‘probing’ strategy can be considered as an 
anticipatory or proactive strategy, as it is characterized with boundary-spanning activities that are not initiated to 
respond, but initiated to anticipate the environment proactively, solving problems even before they emerge. Both 
responsive and proactive strategies have their strengths and weaknesses. The former strategy is strong in 
harmonizing internal operations, but weak in sensing environmental changes. The latter strategy is strong in tracking 
the environmental changes, but weak in creating internal efficiency (Ancona 1990; Ancona and Caldwell 1992). 
Second, with regard to the content, strategies can be identified as professionally-driven strategy and socially-driven 
strategy. For example in Schultz and Orlikowski (2004), the ‘arms-length’ strategy can be identified as a 
professionally-driven strategy as its activities feature much professional interaction but minimal social interaction. 
On the other hand, the ‘social-embeddedness’ strategy can be identified as a socially-driven strategy as its activities 
feature much social interaction but minimal professional interaction. Similarly, both professionally-driven and 
socially-driven strategies have their strengths and weaknesses. The former strategy leads to efficient interaction, but 
confines the emotional connection with the outsiders. The latter strategy induces emotional connection with 
outsiders, but increases cost in the interaction (Levina and Vaast 2006; Schultze and Orlikowski 2004).  
Third, with respect to the structure, strategies can be identified as narrow-engagement strategy and broad-
engagement strategy. The narrow-engagement strategy assigns a limited number of boundary spanners in front of 
the client, whereas the broad-engagement strategy often assigns as many spanners as possible, sometimes the entire 
team (Marrone et al. 2007; Tushman 1977). The structure perspective has long been recognized, because boundary-
spanning activities, by the nature, are implemented and manifested through organization structures (Leifer and 
Delbecq 1978; Leifer and Huber 1977). However, with respect to the effectiveness of the strategies, there lacks an 
agreement and two profound ways of thinking are in sharp contrast. The conventional wisdom (e.g. Allen et al. 
1979; Tushman 1977) suggests that narrow-engagement strategy is more effective. The reason is that the 
differentiation across boundaries makes widespread communication inefficient and prone to distortion. Thus, having 
a limited number of boundary spanners, which results in a unique and authoritative conduit for information transfer, 
can increase efficiency and reduce errors. The modern wisdom (e.g. Friedman and Podolny 1992; Marrone et al. 
2007), on the other hand, suggests that the broad-engagement strategy is more effective. The reason is that the heavy 
workload of boundary spanning makes the spanners easily overloaded if the rest of the team does not share 
responsibility, which is essentially the case in narrow-engagement strategy. Thus, having every employee share the 
boundary-spanning role may reduce the workload on individual spanners and at the same time, offers the group 
more opportunities for valuable information. Both arguments have considerable empirical support. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to believe that the disagreement is attributed to an important contingency that has been overlooked in 
those two streams of studies. We believe that this contingency factor lies under the readiness of internal boundary 
spanners as the effectiveness of the strategies is often limited or strengthened by the spanners. Yet, spanners have 
never been brought up in this context.  
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In addition, these three perspectives are not isolated from or independent of each other. Instead, they complement 
each other effectively by explaining different parts of the strategy. Among these three, the structure perspective is 
indisputably the most critical one, upon which the orientation and content perspectives are built. The structure 
perspective also offers a broader influence, given that groups in the same organization often share the same 
structure-level strategy for boundary spanning. The structural similarity minimizes the transaction costs across 
groups (McKelvey and Kilmann 1975). Hence, structure-level strategies are often decided by the top management of 
the organization and implemented across all the project groups. Comparatively, with respect to the orientation and 
the content, groups in the same organization can and often do adopt different boundary-spanning strategies. For 
example in Ancona (1992), groups of the same organization, can engage clients through different orientations (i.e. 
some are more response-oriented, while others are more anticipate-oriented) and through different content (i.e. some 
prefer professionally-driven interaction, while others prefer socially-driven interaction). In practice, strategies on the 
orientation and content levels are often decided by the team managers rather than organization management. Given 
the criticality and the broad influence of the structure perspective, we adopt it as our primary perspective in this 
research. In the following part, if not specified, boundary-spanning strategies are referred to as structure-level 
boundary-spanning strategies.  
As mentioned above, boundary spanners and boundary-spanning strategies are closely associated. This association is 
mediated through the boundary-spanning capability, which is the embodiment of every employee’s boundary-
spanning abilities. Further, the capability and strategy are intertwined and one cannot take effect without the support 
of the other. For example, boundary-spanning capability cannot be properly developed if the development is not 
guided by a suitable strategy, and boundary-spanning strategy cannot be properly implemented if the 
implementation is not supported by a suitable capability. Hence, instead of maintaining that the capability and 
strategy be important determinants of successful boundary spanning, it is more accurate to state that the alignment of 
the two is the very determinant. As a result, we adopt this alignment as our theoretical lens to understand how 
vendors span boundaries.  From this lens, we derive our research question: 
How does the vendor align its boundary-spanning capability and boundary-spanning strategy? 
Research Methodology 
The case study methodology was adopted for this study. There are two reasons for this. First, the research question 
is a  ‘how’ question, and it is suitable for exploring such questions through case studies (Walsham 1995). Second, 
boundary panning is complex in nature and is inextricably linked to the organizational context (Ancona 1990), 
which makes the qualitative approach more suitable (Klein and Myers 1999). In the process of data collection and 
data analysis, we adopted the approach of ‘soft positivism’ or ‘scientific realism’ (Kirsch 2004; Mitrophanous 
1997). This approach allowed us to conduct the field study with certain expectations based upon prior theories, 
which is more typical of the positivist approach, while also allowing unexpected findings and explanations to 
emerge from the data, which is more typical of the interpretivist approach. Guided by the soft positivism, data was 
collected with the objective of identifying the alignment between boundary-spanning capability and boundary-
spanning strategy. This alignment, as already mentioned, is the theoretical lens which functions as the ‘sensitizing 
device’ (Klein and Myers 1999) in that the interviews are guided by the lens, the voluminous interview data is 
screened through the lens, and the theoretical model is fleshed out based on the lens. However, because boundary 
spanning is often idiosyncratic to the organizational/group context (e.g. Ancona 1990; Ancona and Caldwell 1992), 
we recognized that the capability and strategy may have their own unique characteristics unrelated to any theoretical 
classification offered in the literature. We were thus open to the softer or interpretivist position to welcome 
unexpected findings. Because the alignment has never been discussed in the past literature, it is not difficult to 
encounter unexpected findings.  
Using soft positivism, data analysis was conducted at the same time as the data collection. Data is coded, arranged 
into the identified set of themes and then merged into the emergent model. If the data and model could not merge 
with each other seamlessly, we would go through an iterative process of moving back and forth between data, model 
and relevant literature, until the unexpected data can be explained by the literature and merged into the emergent 
model successfully. The data collection ceased until ‘theoretical saturation’ was reached, in which we experienced 
significant overlaps in the data collected and found it difficult to extend the emergent model in a meaningful way 
(Eisenhardt 1989). With respect to the presentation of the findings, the narrative strategy and visual strategy were 
adopted in order to condense the large amount of data into a more manageable size (Langley 1999) and present the 
emergent model in a more succinct way (Meyer 1991). The diagrams capturing the emergent models were presented 
 Du & Pan / Boundary Spanning by Design 
  
 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010 7 
to the relevant stakeholders of the two organizations to validate our interpretation of the data. To ensure the validity 
of the findings, we verified that each of the findings was supported by at least two data sources (Klein and Myers 
1999). 
For the purpose of case selection, two criteria were identified. First, the case organizations should have active 
boundary-spanning practice and therefore, the researchers would have rich data for analysis. Second, the case 
organizations should have successfully spanned the boundaries so that the findings derived can be recommended to 
other vendor organizations. Based on these two criteria, two case organizations were chosen. The first organization 
is Carta Corporation (a pseudonym), one of China’s leading ITO vendors. The second organization is Magma’s 
Global Support Center (GSC) in China. Magma (a pseudonym) is one of Europe’s leading IT vendors. Both 
organizations take on ITO projects from Japan, which is the second largest IT outsourcing country in the world after 
the US. The Japanese clients are more active than the US ones in engaging boundary-spanning practice with their 
vendors, because of the ‘Keiretsu’ culture (Apte et al. 1997). Thus, this setting has offered a sounder context to 
research boundary spanning than the settings based on US clients. While the first criterion is fairly easy to identify, 
the second one is rather more challenging. Before entering the field, we have limited evidence to prove that the 
organizations that we are going to interview have successful boundary spanning. The best we could do is to select 
the organizations with successful ITO relationships with their clients. Although that success can be attributed to 
multiple factors, it is very likely that successful boundary spanning is one of them. In our cases, both organizations 
have successful relationships with their clients. The second hand data (e.g. newspapers, internal publications and 
industry reports) corroborate this by showing that, in Carta a large percentage of clients evolve to become strategic 
partners after their initial engagement with the company, and in Magma, the majority of clients record a high 
satisfaction rating after them receiving service from the company. The initial data collected further confirmed our 
assumption by exhibiting that both organizations have successfully overcome the occupational and national 
boundaries with their clients, demonstrating the strength of understanding and responding to client needs.  
The two organizations are located at the same city, Dalian City, which is one of the largest software industry bases 
in China. Locating in the northeast region of China, Dalian is geographically close to Japan. Besides, the city also 
has a large Japanese-speaking population on account of its 50-year history as a Japanese colony. Hence, it becomes 
the most popular location for Japanese outsourcing. Since the 1980s, Japanese companies have started to outsource 
their manufacturing and development to Dalian. Some scholars have termed Dalian as the ‘Bangalore of China’ (e.g. 
Oshri et al. 2008), because whereas American and European companies typically have gone to Bangalore, Japanese 
companies have turned to Dalian. Research access was negotiated and granted in October 2009. The Senior Vice 
President of Carta and the General Manager of Magma provided the entry and the widespread access. The first 
round of interviews comprised direct face-to-face interaction, while the follow-up interviews were either face-to-
face or by telephones or e-mails. The interviews were conducted over 10 project groups, ranging in size from 17 to 
80 members. In general, interviews lasted from 90 minutes to 2 hours and were all digitally recorded and later 
transcribed for data analysis. Data triangulation has been achieved through iterative data validation and 
consolidation from the multiple researchers until a congruent and coherent theme emerges (Yin 2003). Whereas the 
personal interviews were the primary data source, they were supplemented by other secondary data such as 
newspaper articles, internal documents, and industry reports. Notes from direct observation were also used to 
corroborate the data obtained (Walsham 2006).  
Case Description 
Carta Corporation 
Carta Corporation is a leading Chinese IT provider and was ranked as the No.1 ITO vendor in China in 2009. The 
company now has over 15,000 staff and 9,000 clients worldwide. However, only 17 years ago this company was 
merely a startup incubated at North University (a pseudonym) with fewer than 10 people. North University is one of 
China’s leading universities, especially in Computer Science. The startup, originally a software and network 
research lab in North University, was incorporated in 1991, as a strategic partnership between the university and 
Aldo Corporation (a pseudonym), a leading Japanese electronics company. Through the data, we found that Carta’s 
boundary-spanning practice evolves in three important phases of the organization. In the following part, we will use 
the narrative strategy to describe the practice in each of the phases.  
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Phase 1: Recruiting Engineers with Advanced Technical Ability (1991-1996) 
Aldo played a critical role in Carta’s early development. During this time, Aldo was the second largest shareholder 
(i.e. the largest was North University) and the major client of the company. Before Aldo made its appearance, Carta 
was only a network and software research lab of North University, with fewer than 10 people (i.e. two university 
professors and the rest being their graduate students) and 30,000 RMB research fund. The partnership started in the 
late 1980s. At that time, Aldo set up two plants for manufacturing embedded systems in the northeast region of 
China. Meanwhile, the company was seeking research institutes for the software development needed in the 
embedded systems. Carta was selected among all the candidates, because the lab had adopted the simulation-
development approach, which was considered as the most contemporary approach, even in the US. The partnership 
was signed in 1991 and it has since been a success.  
Aldo has always been very helpful to us. They engage us very closely. You know, at the beginning, we didn’t have 
any experience working with the Japanese and we often made stupid mistakes. For example, we once received bug 
reports of hundreds of pages…but, Aldo was incredibly patient. They guided us step by step. When they formed the 
partnership with us, they indeed wanted it to be enduring and long-term. We feel very grateful to them. [Senior Vice 
President, one of the four founders]  
In the early days, the key challenge faced by the young organization was the severe shortage of experienced 
engineers. The simulation-development, by its very nature, was irreducibly labor intensive and the existing lab 
engineers were far from being sufficient. Fresh graduates, although low-cost, were not the desirable options at that 
time, because the startup had little training capacity to bring up the inexperienced graduates and very often, new 
recruits were given important project roles right after they came on board. This made the experienced engineers 
highly valuable. Experienced engineers requested limited training, as most of them were already veterans in project 
development. They also had some experience working with the client. This experience was very valuable then, as 
engineers were often required to work closely with the client. However, experienced engineers were difficult to find 
and acquire. To overcome this challenge, Carta sought help from its parent organization, North University. The 
university helped in lobbying its affiliated research labs to partner with or join Carta, which were often filled with 
experienced engineers. Examples of the institutes joining Carta included a Management Information System (MIS) 
lab with a headcount of 25 and a Virtue Networking Research lab of the similar size. Acquiring these experienced 
engineers, the young organization established an outstanding engineering team, which is deemed as the best in the 
northeast region of China. The team also successfully demonstrated its value in front of the client.  
The Carta engineers are amazing. I worked with them on one of the projects. The project was expected to finish in 
four months but they finished it in only two and half months. After that, they came to us, asking for more work. At 
that time I did not have anything for them, so I just pick up a research project that we had given up. Guess what? 
They managed to solve it in just two weeks. I was utterly impressed. [Project Manager, Aldo. Abstracted from the 
book “Beyond technology: the myth behind Carta’s 17-year rapid growth” (Deng 2008, Page 30)]  
Phase 2: Restructuring the Communication Model (1996-2000) 
Carta’s success was not only recognized by Aldo but also by other Japanese companies of which Toshiba was one. 
In 1996, Toshiba formed a partnership with Carta. As a world-renowned technology company with 300,000 staff 
worldwide, Carta had great expectations of the partnership at first. However, it did not take long before the company 
realized that the partnership did not bring them as much as they expected. Most Toshiba projects were merely non-
core and short-term developments, such as debugging, customization and localization. These projects all suffered 
from low profit margin and worse still, they rarely ran on the continuing basis. The discontinuity inevitably 
prevented Carta from accumulating knowledge and creating domain expertise. The company was very concerned 
and it started to analyze the root causes. Soon, it discovered that the problem existed in its communication with the 
client. Before 1996, Carta’s client communication was primarily handled by engineers. In particular, engineers and 
clients were working closely together under a joint-development model. This model worked well in the Aldo 
partnership, wherein projects were more research oriented and with limited communication required. However, 
when coming to work with Toshiba, the model emerged into a notable problem. Toshiba’s teams apparently did not 
appreciate the quality of communication provided by the engineers, who were primarily hired on the strength of 
technical ability and not necessarily good communicators.  
We are not sure if they understand our requirements. The answer that we derive from the regular business 
correspondences seems to be negative…. There are multiple grammatical errors in their correspondence, which are 
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really annoying. How do I trust their codes are error-free, when they are constantly making grammatical errors in 
the emails? [Project Manager, Toshiba (Deng 2008, Page 90) ] 
A straightforward solution was to improve the existing engineers’ communication ability or to replace them with 
ones who are better in communication. However, neither was as viable as it seemed. First, communicative ability 
was difficult to improve in a short period. This was especially true when the communication was conducted in 
Japanese, a language featuring sophisticated rules and vocabularies. Second, the existing engineers could not be 
replaced easily, because they were the indispensible part of the technical capability. Carta had spent enormous 
efforts in building up the technical capability. This capability had thus been firmly embedded into the organization 
and any change to it would encounter severe resistances. The organization also positioned the technical capability as 
its competitive advantage and any change to it might jeopardize the organization’s survival.  
An indirect approach was to downgrade the communication model to work around with the limitations of the 
existing capability. Although this approach seemed like an avoidance or escape, the management team finally 
decided to take it. The joint-development model was thus downgraded to a separated-development model, in which 
the engagement level was reduced from multiple persons to one person. This one person was named as Window 
Project Manager (short for ‘Window’), since s/he functioned as the window between the two parties. This model 
was then referred as window-communication model. In this model, only the Window was allowed to communicate 
with the client. On the one hand, the Window gathered the information from the client and articulated it to the 
engineering team in a language that engineers were able to understand. On the other hand, the Window ensured the 
information released from the engineering team was accurate and professional, with respect to both content and 
language. Given the importance, the Window must be no ordinary employee. S/he must be a technical expert and a 
good communicator at the same time.   
The Window is the superstar of the team. They must have a lot of experience in their domain and have no problems 
in communicating in Japanese. Sometimes, we could not find enough qualified Windows inside the company. So, we 
went overseas and recruited Japan-born engineers to be Windows. But these people must also have the relevant 
technical background. Without any of these two abilities, they could not accomplish the job. [Senior Manager who 
used to be a Window]  
In spite of the negative feeling of downgrading, the window-communication model was a great success. It 
effectively enhanced client communication with only the existing capabilities at hand. The client also liked this new 
model, as their requests were often understood accurately and responded promptly through the Window. Since the 
Windows were the only Carta employees that the client could see, they also played the representational role. 
Because of their technical plausibility and communication appeal, the Window gave the client peace of mind and 
great confidence in the team. Clients often imagined that they were served by an elite team, every one of which was 
both technical and communicative strong. As a result of the success in communication, Toshiba started to assign 
important and large-scale projects to Carta. By 2003, the client had outsourced in total 30-million USD businesses. 
Meanwhile, the window-communication had also gained popularity in Carta and soon became its standard practice 
for client communication. This standard practice was also well received by the engineering team, as it freed the team 
from clients’ pressures so that they can then focus on improving on technical excellence.   
Phase 3: Further Enhancing Engineers’ Abilities (2000-Present)  
This period is the golden age for China’s ITO industry, in which Carta has enjoyed an unprecedented growth rate. 
The revenue doubled in approximately every two years and the projects were becoming larger. Some clients 
outsourced their entire IT functions to Carta and some of these projects used a few hundred engineers. Because the 
window-communication had isolated the engineers from client communication, the engineers became more 
technical-oriented and less professional-oriented. In this case, experienced engineers did not have much more value 
than the fresh graduates. Carta were thus more inclined to recruit low-cost fresh graduates, who were well trained in 
coding. These engineers were often referred as ‘code warriors’.  In 2000 Carta started to build its own IT institute, 
Carta Institute (a pseudonym). Currently, Carta Institute has established three campuses, with over 25,000 students 
in total. Every year, it supplied the company with over 2000 graduates. The reason that Carta built its own institute 
rather than recruiting from public institutes was that the company could ensure the graduates were well trained in 
coding. Curriculums in Carta institute were thus designed in a polarized matter, with over emphasis on coding and 
limited coverage on the rest, such as business acumen and communication. Conversely, this polarized curriculum 
did not bring down the value of the graduates, but instead it enhanced the values. The technical strength that it 
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imparted has become a favorable trait of the graduates.  Now, even the industry leaders, such as IBM and HP, came 
to Carta Institute for recruitment. 
 I think one of our biggest advantages is the IT institute. Today, we could easily recruit 2000 graduates per year 
from the institute, and 2000 IT graduates are not easy to get in the job market, even in China. Also, our graduates 
have advantages that others don’t. Since our institute focuses purely on coding, our graduates have intense coding 
experiences right after graduating. And now even IBM, HP and Sun are coming to us for talents. [Program 
Manager, Outsourcing Division] 
However, to support the window-communication, a large pool of code warriors alone was not enough. The 
organization needed a group of elites who were able to function as Windows. So, another enhancement that Carta 
made to its capability was the development of Windows. As already mentioned, Carta used to hire Japanese 
engineers as Windows in the early stage, because there were not enough qualified Windows internally. This gap was 
well elaborated by an internal project-manager assessment, which revealed that in 2000 only 70% of project 
managers were qualified to function as Windows (Deng 2008, Page 90). Yet, this number has been increased 
substantially since then. In 2006 it reached 90% and in 2007 it exceeded 130%, meaning that Carta not only had 
enough Windows for its current projects but also 30% reserve for its future deployment. This increase was made 
possible by the high-end language and culture training, which was often conducted in Japan, with the objective of 
immersing the trainees into the most authentic environment. However, unlike the technical training, this 
communicative training was only limited to selected employees. These employees were either existing project 
managers or technical leaders who were on the track to become the Windows.   
The communication-related training is not the primary focus of the organization. The primary focus is still on 
technical training…. the communicative training is not open to everyone. It is a premium program that is only 
available for managers or technical leaders, like us. Sometimes, we are also given the opportunities to work in 
Japan on rotation basis. This is very helpful for us to understand how to work with Japanese. [Technical Leader, on 
the track of becoming a Window] 
Magma AG 
Magma Global Support Center (GSC) is the subsidiary of Magma AG, a global corporation that provides enterprise 
software. Magma is best known for its Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system. The company has 47,000 
employees now and users in over 120 countries. To support these users, Magma has built numerous local support 
centers. However, the organization later realized that it was more effective to consolidate those small local support 
centers into large-scale Global Support Centers (GSCs) and then locate these GSCs in countries with low labor cost. 
Seven GSCs were thus set up in Brazil, Ireland, Spain, Austria, India, Malaysia, and China. In contrast to 
conventional practice that support centers are cost centers, in today’s ITO context support centers are in fact a major 
revenue generator of the vendors. Nowadays, a large component of the ITO contract is pertinent to support and 
maintenance. Industry leaders, such as Magma and Oracle, enjoy nearly 50% of the total revenue from providing 
support (see example of Oracle's annual report 2009) and this percentage is continuing  to grow in the foreseeable 
future, as attributed to the low profit margin from the software licensing and one-off implementation. As a result, the 
support centers are becoming an increasingly important part of the ITO business. GSC China was set up in 1997 to 
support the Asia Pacific and Japan (APJ) region, with the primary focus on Japan. The center is now able to handle 
80,000 issues a month, which is on a par with the most established and mature GSCs. Similar to the Carta case, we 
also derive three important phases with respect to Magma’s boundary-spanning practice and we use the narrative 
strategy to describe the practice in each of the phases.   
Phase 1: Creating a Communication Model (1997-2004) 
The China support center was set up in 1997, aiming to take over the support center in Japan. However, the new 
center did not develop quickly and migration was constantly dragged back. The management team had major 
concerns that the offshore support may not work as effectively as the local one, because Magma’s systems might be 
too complicated to be supported by an offshore team. The systems had such as a broad range, including nearly every 
enterprise system in the marketing.  This complexity inevitably generated enormous support workload. Often, 
because every client thought their problems more important than others, they expected the workload to be cleared 
promptly and swiftly. To deal with the heavy workload and the pressure in handling it, Magma needed a mass 
delivery model and the message-solving (MS) mechanism was thus created. The model works as follows: the user 
submits a message when s/he encounters an issue; the message contains all the information needed to understand the 
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issue, such as the technical component, the priority, and the symptoms; each message is assigned to a consultant 
through an automatic routing system that matches the technical component of the issue with the expertise of the 
consultants; for example, an issue pertinent to the database will be routed to a database consultant; every consultant, 
upon joining, will be trained to become an expert in a specific set of technical components. In the MS mechanism, 
consultants face clients directly, without the middlemen, and this speeds up the response time, as issue resolution 
often needs joint efforts and intensive collaboration between the consultant and the client.   
However, despite the merits, the MS mechanism did not produce the expected outcomes at this stage, because 
consultants in new organization were not able to meet the high requirements demanded by the MS mechanism. 
Consultants must have both technical ability and communicative ability in order to be productive in the MS 
mechanism. Technical ability is needed, without which consultants are not able to become technical specialists. 
Communicative ability is needed, without which consultants are not able to communicate with clients directly. In 
addition, the high expectations from the Japanese clients raised the bar even higher. First, they expected the perfect 
technical solution. For example, any bug in the code was considered to be an embarrassment. Second, they expected 
error-free correspondence. For instance, emails with grammatical mistakes would not be read. The general manager 
summed up this challenge elaborately “We are probably taking the hardest job in IT support”.  
Phase 2: Recruiting Engineers with Technical and Communicative Abilities (2004-2008)  
China ITO business came to a new arena at this phase. The government offered various preferential policies to 
attract foreign investors to set up their ITO centers. Under this circumstance, many Magma’s competitors and 
partners, such as GE, Oracle, and IBM, started to move their Japanese support centers to China. Finally, Magma’s 
management team made the decision to officially start the long-dragged migration. The very first task on the to-do 
list was to recruit talents with both technical and communicative abilities and fit them into the MS mechanism. The 
organization soon realized that this recruitment was very challenging. In the job market, people with technical 
ability were many and people with communicative ability were also prevalent, but people with both abilities together 
were very limited. These people were often at the high-end of the job market and were expensive to acquire. 
However, the organization decided not to compromise the quality.   
The weakest hire I would accept would be someone who only majored in Japanese but maybe worked 3 years in 
Japan in a technical role. That is probably the weakest candidate I will consider. Anything else doesn’t work. 
[General Manager] 
In order to attract these high-end consultants, Magma took several approaches. First, it strategically located its office 
in two cities (i.e. Dalian and Shanghai) so that it could have access to talents in both cities and give them more 
flexibility in choosing where to work. In general, graduates from north China may prefer Dalian over Shanghai and 
graduates from south China may prefer Shanghai over Dalian. Second, the organization sponsored a double-major 
program (i.e. one major in engineering and the other in Japanese) in the best university of Dalian. That program was 
also the best in the university, offered to only the top students. Because of the sponsorship, Magma’s priority was to 
recruit its members for internship and very likely, interns would choose to stay after the term. Attributing this to the 
prestigious brand and excellent career development opportunities, Magma never had any problems in wooing the 
best graduates. Third, the recruitment was also stretched to overseas, with the objective of taking Japan-born 
engineers or Chinese immigrants who had worked in Japan for a couple of years.  
Even when the employees were very talented, they could not become productive until they have been through an 
intensive training. The training is so intensive that every time before a new employee signing up the contract, the 
manager would warn him/her that: “Are you sure that you want to join us? You know, the learning process will be 
very tough.” The training was in two stages. First, new employees were given 3 to 6 months to familiarize 
themselves with the MS mechanism, after which, they would be assigned to handle low-priority issues. Magma had 
faith in their consultants that after the initial training, they would be able to face the client. The second stage was 
longer, ranging from 14 month to 2 years, depending on the readiness of the consultants. At this stage, the 
consultants would be assigned to a specific set of technical areas and to acquire deep knowledge in those areas. 
Alongside the technical training, consultants are also mandated to take various communicative training.  
With regard to the language training, we have a full-time trainer in-house. She is Japanese and she used to work for 
Magma Japan. So she understands the contexts that we are in and she can adjust the training according to our 
work. The consultants find this kind of training very effective…We also have intensive training on client interaction. 
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The company often flies interaction experts from Japan here to conduct this training. [Consultant who handles 
message solving] 
Phase 3: Further Enhancing the Communication Model (2008-Present) 
Through the high-end recruiting and the intensive training, GSC China developed a strong consulting team, in which 
everyone was able to communicate effectively with clients and everyone have evolved to be a technical specialist, 
some even being nominated as globally recognized experts. Using this team, the MS mechanism started to show its 
advantage. In year 2008, over 800,000 issues were solved and most of them were solved in a short time. Client 
satisfaction was thus maintained to an equally high level, with a slight decrease, as compared to the time when 
support was provided by local Japanese consultants.  Despite the great success, the management team did not want 
to just settle there, rather they aspired to offer clients more value-added services and improve client satisfaction to 
another level. The improvement was made at the support mode. Previously, the support was following a responsive 
mode in which consultants waited for clients to contact them and then delivered the service. In the new mode, the 
consultants were expected to proactively engage the client. Under this new mode, a new team were set up, namely 
the Support Advisory Center (SAC) team.   
Customer satisfaction is the core value for us. But, it cannot be significantly improved through the existing support 
mode. We need a new one. We need to actively drive clients. We need to exceed their expectations and provide 
services before they even ask for it. [Group Leader, SAC] 
SAC was initially set up under the message-solving team, but with a distinct approach as compared to the MS team. 
Instead of waiting for the client to raise issues and log messages, SAC proactively surveyed clients and eliminated 
issues before they even emerged. The survey was often conducted through conference calls with the client. In 
general, clients were open to share their concerns or potential issues, but some still remained skeptical. So 
consultants needed to persuade the reluctant ones to share. Another approach, which was more automatic and 
impersonal, was to install monitoring software on the client systems. The software would screen the system 
regularly and send back status reports, based on which the SAC team could identify the potential issues and then 
approach the client with targeted solutions on hand. Again, some clients remained skeptical about installing the 
software on their systems and consultants had to persuade them. The SAC team was well received by the client. It 
received 64 thank-you notes within the first five months of its operation. As a result of this initiative, the client 
satisfaction rose to a new level, higher than the time when support was provided by the Japanese support center. The 
success would not be possible without a handful of experienced consultants, who were developed over the years. 
After the earlier development, these consultants have accumulated robust technical and communicative abilities, 
which enabled them to implement this proactive support mode successfully.  
SAC service was actually a very comprehensive process. Currently, only our group can do this. The group members 
are very carefully selected. Each of them has at least 3-year experience working in message-solving. So, they all 
have very wide knowledge and experience with regard to Magma’s systems. They also have a very good feeling of 
communicating with the client. [Group Leader, SAC] 
Discussion 
To recall the research question, this study aspires to uncover how the vendor aligns boundary-spanning capability 
and its boundary-spanning strategy. As we progress from the field to our model, to the literature, then back to the 
field and again to the literature, we inductively derive two models. The first model delineates two alignment forms 
and the second model delineates two aligning paths. Both are important facets of the alignment. The form model 
ascertains the final output of the alignment, without understanding which, the vendor may not know whether its 
arrangement is aligned and which direction it should work towards. The path model depicts the process to achieve 
alignment, without understanding which, the vendor may linger on the way to alignment but not reach there. Given 
that these two models are inductively derived from empirical data, the following report provides an explanation of 
how the existing literature corroborates the models.   
Alignment Forms 
The two organizations have adopted two distinct forms of alignment in which two types of boundary-spanning 
capabilities are identified (Figure 1). In Carta, the boundary-spanning capability is only partially developed. Most 
employees have only a strong technical ability but limited communicative ability. Given the polarized development, 
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we theorize this type of capability as the ‘polarized capability’. Vendors with rich technical capability but limited 
communicative capability are prevalent. For example, software-development vendors, which often overemphasize 
technology and overlook communication, result in a polarized capability (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; 
Richmond and Seidmann 1993). In Magma, the boundary-spanning capability, on the other hand, is fully developed. 
Every employee has both technical and communicative abilities. Given the ambidextrous development, we theorize 
this type of capability as the ‘ambidextrous capability’. This capability is not unique to Magma either. Rather, it is 
prevalent among system-development vendors and technical support centers, which often handle client-specific 
problems and frequently communicate across different client functions (Allen et al. 1979). Aligned with the two 
capabilities, two distinct strategies are identified. In Carta, the strategy is enacted through the window-
communication model. External engagement is confined to Windows only and the rest team remains isolated from 
the client. Hence, the strategy is discerned as a form of the ‘narrow-engagement strategy’ (Marrone et al. 2007; 
Tushman 1977). On the other hand, the strategy of Magma is enacted through the Message-solving mechanism. 
Then, the boundary spanning responsibility is distributed to every consultant in the team, rather than to some 
specific individuals. Hence, the strategy is identified as a form of the ‘broad-engagement strategy’ (Marrone et al. 
2007; Tushman 1977).  
Boundary-spanning  Capability
Polarized Capability
Most employees have technical ability but lack 
communicative ability. The recruitment targets on engineers 
and training focuses on technical knowledge.
Ambidextrous Capability
Most employees have both technical ability and communicative 
ability. The recruitment targets on ambidextrous employees and 
training focuses on both technical and communicative abilities. 
Boundary-spanning Strategy
Employee with both technical ability
and communicative ability
Employee with technical 
abilities only CTT
Narrow-engagement Strategy Broad-engagement Strategy
Carta Magma GSC
Both information assimilation and releasing are channeled 
and guarded by the Window. Internal engineers remain 
isolated from the client, who can only communicate through 
the Window.
Everyone is assigned a role as the boundary spanner. They are 
contacted based on their expertise and the area of the issues. 
Everyone can communicate with the client, who can also 
communicate with multiple consultants.   
CT
T
T
T T
Vendor Client
CT
CT
CT
Vendor Client
 
Figure 1: Two Alignment Forms of Boundary-spanning Capability and Boundary-spanning Strategy 
Moreover, we find that the polarized capability and the ambidextrous capability are not distinct but rather rest on the 
same continuum, with respect to the level of communicative capability. The polarized capability lies at one end, 
with a low level of communicative capability. The ambidextrous capability lies in the other end, with a high level of 
communicative capability. The technical capability is taken for granted in this continuum, as it is the very basic 
capability for an ITO vendor to survive (Ramasubbu et al. 2008). Although the polarized capability scores low in 
communication, its technical component is often outstanding, because of the polarized focus. This technical 
excellence can somehow compensate for its incompetence in communication. For instance, clients are often more 
patient and respectful in communicating with vendors who have demonstrated strong research capability. Similarly, 
the narrow-engagement strategy and the broad-engagement strategy also rest on the same continuum, with respect to 
the level of transparency. The narrow engagement lies in one end, with low transparency. The broad engagement 
lies in the other end, with high transparency. Our empirical data shows that these two continuums can be aligned 
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seamlessly. At one end, the polarized capability and the narrow-engagement strategy are aligned well. The narrow-
engagement strategy can hide the weakness of the polarized capability and at the same time bring about the strength 
of it. At the other end, the ambidextrous capability and the broad-engagement strategy are aligned well. The broad-
engagement strategy can maximize the ambidextrous capability and at the same time exhibit the full strength of it. 
However, the reverse alignment is neither achievable nor desirable. First, the alignment between polarized capability 
and broad-engagement strategy is unachievable, because the strategy demands so many boundary spanners that the 
polarized capability is not able to afford. Second, the alignment between ambidextrous capability and narrow-
engagement strategy is undesirable, because the ambidextrous capability far exceeds the requirement of the narrow-
engagement strategy. Given that the ambidextrous capability is costly and challenging to develop, the polarized way 
of using it creates a great deal of waste.   
Aligning Paths 
The two organizations also took two distinct paths to align their boundary-spanning capability and boundary-
spanning strategy (Figure 2). Carta designed its strategy to align with the capability, whereas Magma designed its 
capability to align with the strategy. Carta’s path was attributed to the fact that its polarized capability had already 
been firmly embedded in the organization when the boundary-spanning strategy was invoked. The embeddedness of 
the polarized capability was created through the company’s early history (Barney 1991). At that time, Carta was 
operated as a research lab, mainly taking on research projects. The research nature made its capability development 
less balanced, in which a strong technical capability was created while the communicative capability was largely 
overlooked. Although polarized, the capability was very effective. It helped Carta deliver solutions beyond the 
client’s expectation and gain a reputation of technical excellence. This early development also influenced the 
organization’s future strategic choice, given that organizations are path-dependent and what organizations do today 
often depends on what they have done in the past (e.g. Pan et al. 2006; Pan et al. 2007). When clients started to 
express their dissatisfaction with the polarized capability and called for more communicative capability, the 
organization faced dilemma of two choices. The first choice was to seek new capability to replace the existing one, 
which is commonly known as the ‘capability-seeking’ path (e.g. Berger and Udell 1995; Lerner 1995). The second 
choice was to do with whatever capability is at hand, which is commonly known as the ‘bricolage’ path (Levi-
Strauss 1966). Both paths have their merits and issues. The capability-seeking path can ease the constraints but will 
inevitably hurt the existing capability. The bricolage path can work around the constraints but will be difficult to 
sustain (Baker and Nelson 2005). Given that the polarized capability was firmly embedded and any change to it may 
jeopardize the survival of the organization (Lavie 2006), Carta took the bricolage path. It enacted the constraints 
(Weick 1979) and re-organized the existing polarized capability in a different manner (e.g. Cameron 1994; Sutton 
1987). In particular, the joint development model was replaced by a restricted window-communication model to 
align with the polarized capability. The narrow-engagement strategy was thus created. However, the bricolage path 
is not only about avoiding constraints. It also creates competitive values (Baker and Nelson 2005). Through 
bricolage, Carta freed its engineers from communication and focused them on the technical strength, delivering the 
technical excellence as a result.  
In Magma, the path is the other way round. The organization had the strategy first and then designed the capability 
base on the need of the strategy. This is attributed to the fact that as a new entrant, Magma had limited capability 
available. This vacuum not only rendered the bricolage path irrelevant but also brought no constraints to the new 
strategy. So, the new strategy could be fabricated to best suit the support task. That is how the broad-engagement 
strategy was created. However, the strategy was without any constraint. The high requirement for the boundary-
spanning capability was difficult to fulfill by nature. To ease this constraint, the organization took the capability-
seeking path (e.g. Berger and Udell 1995; Lerner 1995). The new capability was tailored to the broad-engagement 
strategy (e.g. Helfat and Peteraf 2003; Montealegre 2002). Consistently, high-end recruiting and intensive training 
were established: 1) new employees were hired only if they had both technical background and no difficulties in 
communication in Japanese; and 2) new recruits were only qualified for being productive after they had been 
through intensive technical and communicative training. The ambidextrous capability was thus created.  
Our data further reveals that, even within one path, the process is not static, but iterative. In Carta, the path connects 
to a bricolage loop. In Magma, the path connects to a capability-seeking loop (Figure 2). In Carta, after the narrow-
engagement strategy was established, the strategy in turn reinforced the boundary-spanning capability. This is 
evident in the third stage, when the organization changed its recruitment practice. Since the narrow-engagement 
strategy had restricted the professional service, experienced engineers who had client experience were no longer 
preferred. At the same time, low-cost fresh engineers with intensive coding experience became more desirable. The 
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organization then established its own IT institute to produce engineers that were tailored to narrow-engagement 
strategy. As a result, the polarization of the capability was further reinforced (Montealegre 2002). In Magma, once 
the ambidextrous capability was developed, it subsequently enhanced the strategy. This is also evident in the third 
stage when the proactive support mode was initiated. Since substantial technical capability (e.g. several globally 
recognized domain experts) and communicative capability (e.g. multiple experienced customer handling 
consultants) had been accumulated after strictly following the broad-engagement strategy, the organization had the 
competence to shift its support from the responsive mode to the proactive mode. The strategy remained unchanged 
at the structure level but it changed at the orientation level (e.g. Ancona 1990; Ancona and Caldwell 1992). Past 
research has implied that broad-engagement strategy, because of the distributed responsibility (Marrone et al. 2007; 
Tushman 1977) might suffer from one important issue. Since every boundary spanner has some responsibility but is 
not solely responsible, s/he may not be fully motivated to take the initiative to approach clients (Ancona 1990). The 
proactive mode solved this issue effectively and subsequently, enhanced the broad-engagement strategy.  
Polarized 
Capability
Narrow-engagement
Strategy
2. Reinforce 
Polarization 
1. Constrain
Strategy
Bricolage  
Loop
1. Constrain Strategy: the narrow-engagement strategy 
was designed to work around constraints of the existing 
polarized capability, which was tightly embedded. 
2. Reinforce Polarization: the polarized capability was 
further enhanced through following the narrow-
engagement strategy, which had become the de facto in 
the boundary-spanning practice. 
Carta
 
Ambidextrous 
Capability
Broad-engagement
Strategy
2. Enhance   
Broadness 
1. Seek 
Capability
Capability-seeking 
Loop
1. Seek Capability: the ambidextrous capability was 
sought after the requirement from the broad-engagement 
strategy, which had been pre-defined to suit the job nature. 
2. Enhance Broadness: the broad-engagement strategy 
was further enhanced, by adding more proactive and social 
interactions, which became achievable with the advance of 
the ambidextrous capability.   
Magma GSC
 
Figure 2: Two Paths for Aligning Boundary-spanning Capability and Boundary-spanning Strategy 
Boundary-spanning by Design 
From the alignment-form model and the aligning-path model, we distill a conclusion that boundary-spanning 
practice of the two organizations, in fact, happens by design. Rather than the typical boundary-spanning practice 
which happens unregulated (e.g. Ancona 1990; Ancona and Caldwell 1992), the two organizations’ boundary-
spanning happens through either consciously excising the boundary-spanning strategy or purposely seeking the 
boundary-spanning capability. Design concept has with it two important facets: the artifact of the design and the 
process of the design (Hevner et al. 2004). In our study, the alignment-form model functions as the design artifact as 
it delineates the final output of the alignment and the aligning-path model functions as the design process as it draws 
the process on how to achieve alignment. In the process, the designers of the boundary spanning, usually the top 
management (McKelvey and Kilmann 1975), must be fully cognizant of both the capability and strategy. 
Nevertheless, the by-design models are not unique to Carta and Magma. Rather, they are applicable to the vendor 
community. There are two main reasons that vendors design the boundary spanning. First, it is necessary for them to 
do so. In the ITO relationship, vendors often suffer from having more limited resources (Levina and Vaast 2008) 
and lower bargaining power (Levina and Kane 2009) than clients. To overcome those challenges, vendors need to 
plan ahead carefully to present the best part of their capability and portrait a competitive image. By doing so, they 
can gain respect and trust from the client and subsequently secure more resources and increase the bargaining 
power. The misalignment, on the other hand, can result the vendor being in a dire situation, where the client 
perceives them as incompetent partner and co-operates less. This kind of perception, once formed, is often difficult 
IT Project Management and Outsourcing 
16 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010  
to reverse. Besides the necessity to design boundary spanning, vendors also have the flexibility to do so. This is 
attributed to vendors’ flexibility in arranging the complementary assets, such as the capability and the organizational 
structure (Levina and Ross 2003). This flexibility is absent in the client’s organization, who often faces the difficulty 
of rearranging their IT personnel and project team around the projects. This is further corroborated by considerable 
empirical evidence suggesting that internal IT groups often fail to span boundaries with their internal clients during 
IT implementation (e.g. Levina and Vaast 2006; Schultze and Orlikowski 2004). And, this inflexibility can be one of 
the reasons that clients chose to outsource IT projects to vendors, even when they have the economies of scale.    
Conclusions 
Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
By addressing the research question set out at the beginning of the paper, this study makes several important 
theoretical contributions. First, it fills an important gap in the literature of the ITO relationship, a relationship which 
calls for more effective boundary spanning (Couto et al. 2006; Cowley 2004). Up to now, research on boundary 
spanning has been lacking because it has only adopted the client perspective (Levina and Kane 2009; Levina and 
Vaast 2008). This study sheds light on the vendor perspective. Through the creative theoretical lens of the boundary-
spanning alignment, two models are derived on how vendors span boundaries. The first model theorizes two types of 
alignment: firstly, the alignment between polarized capability and narrow-engagement strategy and secondly, the 
alignment between ambidextrous capability and broad-engagement strategy. The second model theorizes two types 
of aligning paths, namely the strategy-design path (i.e. bricolage path) and the capability-design path (i.e. capability-
seeking path). Vendors with embedded and strategic boundary-spanning capabilities may design the strategy to align 
with the capability, while vendors with loosely embedded or obsolete boundary-spanning capability may design new 
capability to align with the strategy. From these two models, we further derive that vendor boundary spanning 
occurs by design, instead of happening unregulated (e.g. Ancona 1990; Ancona and Caldwell 1992). In addition, 
through synthesizing the by-design concept and vendors’ complementary assets (Levina and Ross 2003), we further 
discover that the flexibility to design boundary spanning is an integral part of vendors’ core competence, and at the 
same time one of its competitive advantages over the clients’ internal IT groups, who often fail in boundary 
spanning because of the inflexibility in designing the practice. 
On the other hand, this study also makes significant contributions to the literature on boundary spanning. Previous 
research on boundary spanning has had two important themes: boundary spanner (e.g. Tushman and Scanlan 1981a; 
Tushman and Scanlan 1981b) and boundary-spanning strategy (Ancona 1990; Ancona and Caldwell 1992). 
Although these two themes were often treated separately, they are in fact highly interdependent, because one cannot 
take effect without aligning with the other. Yet, through a review of existing literature, we have failed to identify a 
single study that examines this alignment. One possible reason is that boundary spanners are often treated on the 
individual-level and their connection with the strategy is often overlooked. To overcome that gap, our study 
introduced the concept of boundary-spanning capability, an organization-level capability that is instantiated by the 
collection of individual spanners. Through conceptualizing boundary-spanning capability, we elevate the influence 
of individual boundary spanners to the strategic level and successfully associate the spanners’ abilities with the 
organizational strategy.  
The by-design concept offers a rational perspective to the boundary-spanning research, which has been dominated 
by the open-system and natural perspectives. Those two perspectives have taken boundary spanning as either pure 
inter-organizational activities (e.g. Dollinger 1984; Fennell and Alexander 1987) or pure social-shaped interaction 
(e.g. Levina and Vaast 2006; Schultze and Orlikowski 2004). However, they fail to look at the boundary spanning as 
the design that organization chooses to achieve proper goals, which is the essence of the rational perspective (Scott 
1998). Given that the rational perspective often functions as the basis for the natural and open-system perspectives 
(Scott 1998), it is important to fill that gap. Our study is one attempt. 
In addition, the two alignment forms also help to reconcile a conflict of two schools of thought. As discussed in the 
literature review, Tushman (1977) believes that the number of boundary spanners is negatively associated with the 
boundary-spanning effectiveness, whereas Marrone et al. (2007) maintains that the association is positive. Although 
both arguments are based on rich theoretical and empirical analyses, which rest mainly on the environmental factors, 
as influenced by the open-system perspective (Boulding 1956), yet they overlook the internal characteristics, as 
attributed to the lack of rational perspective (Scott 1998). Specifically, neither of the arguments has considered the 
readiness of the internal boundary spanners or in other words, neither has considered the influence of the internal 
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boundary-spanning capability. However, it may be the internal capability that makes the difference. By offering the 
boundary-spanning capability as a contingency factor, our study provides a possible explanation for the two 
contradictory thoughts. Last, the study also reveals that boundary-spanning practice is a dynamic process rather than 
a static process. The iteration between the capability and strategy is constant. Hence, it is recommended that future 
researchers adopt a dynamic view on boundary-spanning matters rather than a static view (e.g. Ancona 1990; 
Ancona and Caldwell 1992; Fennell and Alexander 1987). 
In terms of practical implications, this study should also be particularly useful, especially for vendors. One critical 
challenge faced by vendors in ITO is that they often fail to span boundaries with clients (Whitten and Leidner 2006). 
The by-design models can help vendors solve this problem, as the models offer a set of practical instructions on how 
to align boundary-spanning strategy and boundary-spanning capability, in order to achieve success. For example, the 
vendor may use the alignment-form model to assess whether its boundary-spanning strategy and capability are 
aligned. If the assessment reveals a misalignment, the vendor may then use the aligning-path model to guide it to 
reach alignment. On the other hand, this research is also helpful to the client. Through uncovering vendor boundary 
spanning, the client can better understand how vendors span boundaries with them and support vendors accordingly. 
For instance, knowing that a vendor is using the narrow-engagement strategy, the client should not bypass the broker 
(e.g. Window) to directly communicate with the internal group, because the internal group is not designed for client 
communication and by doing so, the client may harm the vendor’s pre-designed boundary-spanning structure. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Despite the theoretical and practical contributions, the current findings must be considered in the light of limitations, 
which also point to important directions for future research. First, a common criticism of the case study 
methodology is the problem of generalizability or external validity (Walsham 2006). It must be acknowledged that 
statistical generalization is impossible with only two case studies. However, we assert that our study is valid and can 
be generalized beyond the two organizational contexts because the two alignment models are not only grounded in 
the empirical reality of real organizations but are also corroborated by some of the most established work in the 
management and IS literature. Thus, this study invokes the principles of ‘analytic generalization’ (Yin 2003). 
Nevertheless, future research can deal with the limitations related to statistical generalizability by statistically testing 
the propositions from the two models. Second, we focused mainly on vendor operation and opinions in this study 
and did not seek the client’s opinion very much (with the exception of client quotes abstracted from the industry 
report). Although this study is about vendor perspective on boundary spanning, it would still be helpful to 
understand how client perceives it. At present, boundary-spanning research that incorporates both client and vendor 
perspectives is comparatively rare. Future research should further consider this area. Third, the two cases are two 
extreme examples in boundary-spanning alignment. They sit at the two ends of both capability and strategy 
continuums. Although the extreme cases make the contrast more salient and make the theoretical constructs more 
significant (Eisenhardt 1989), they overlook cases that happen in the middle of the continuums. In fact, 
organizations that lie in the middle of the two continuums may bring more assets and fewer liabilities as compared 
to the two extreme alignment forms. Hence, it would be fruitful to confirm that.   
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